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Abstract
Recent neuroscientific models of human behavior distinguish
between different cognitive controllers: two instrumental sys-
tems (goal-directed and habitual) that maximize utility through
learned actions, and a so-called Pavlovian system, which im-
plements innate reactive responses. Although the interaction
between instrumental and Pavlovian controllers has been sug-
gested as a key process underlying emotional phenomena and
surprising forms of misbehavior, few is known about it, es-
pecially in the sensorimotor aversive domain. With a com-
bined experimental and computational approach, we study the
interactions between instrumental (goal-directed) and Pavlo-
vian processes in the aversive domain. First, we present a
human experiment in which goal-directed and Pavlovian sys-
tems compete in order to control responses. The results indi-
cate that Pavlovian processes can significantly interfere with
goal-directed behavior. Second, we compare four alternative
Bayesian models for their accuracy in modeling human per-
formance. The results indicate a better fit for an architecture in
which the Pavlovian controller can use both model-based and
model-free features.
Keywords: Goal-directed system, Pavlovian system, Bayesian
model, implicit classical conditioning.
Introduction
Recent models of human and non-human cognitive control
assume that behavior depends on the joint activity of multiple
cognitive systems (Dayan and Seymour, 2008): a so-called
“multicontroller” framework. The existence of interacting be-
havioral controllers is supported by numerous data in the an-
imal literature (Adams and Dickinson, 1981). For instance,
in experimental paradigms such as devaluation and contin-
gency degradation, Dickinson (1985) showed that instrumen-
tal behavior of rats usually depends on associations between
actions and outcomes, and on associations between outcomes
and their current assigned values. However, in some circum-
stances, namely when action is simple and overtrained, rats
follow simpler stimulus-response associations. The former
pattern of behavior was thought as being controlled by a goal-
directed system (GDC), the latter by a habitual system (HAB).
Although they adopt different mechanisms, both these instru-
mental controllers aim at maximizing utility.
Moreover, a third type of controller has been proposed: a
Pavlovian system (PAV) (Dayan and Seymour, 2008). Ani-
mal studies have demonstrated the existence of complex be-
havioral patterns that are rigid and inbuilt in nature, as they
are not learned through the ontogenetic development (Fendt
and Fanselow, 1999). These so-called Pavlovian responses
involve either the avoidance or the approach of salient bio-
logical stimuli (unconditioned stimuli, US) and cues associ-
ated to them (conditioned stimuli, CS). Since the rapid ac-
tivation of these behavioral patterns has increased the fit-
ness of the organism during evolution, Pavlovian mechanisms
are inherited. The importance of PAV in affecting behavior
has been shown in animal experimental paradigms in which
the activation of Pavlovian responses dramatically impaired
goal-directed performance. For instance, Hershberger (1986)
showed that chickens do not learn to run away from a source
of food that they can see through a “looking glass” in order to
get access to it. A similar paradoxical effect was observed in
an experimental procedure called negative automaintenance
(Williams and Williams, 1969). Food was given to pigeons
when they abstained to peck a CS; nonetheless, these animals
were unable to learn this instrumental contingency and con-
tinued to peck it.
In this article, we address two open issues within this litera-
ture, both relative to the nature of PAV. The first one concerns
the interactions between PAV and instrumental controllers, in
particular GDC, that has been considered a key process un-
derlying many emotional phenomena (Seymour and Dolan,
2008) and a source of maladaptive behavior such as impul-
sivity, dread and framing effects (Dayan and Seymour, 2008).
While Daw et al. (2005) proposed that GDC and HAB com-
pete on the basis of their uncertainty, less is known about the
GDC-PAV and HAB-PAV interactions.
In relation to the second controversial issue, it is unclear
which are the computational mechanisms adopted by PAV.
From a computational perspective, GDC and HAB have been
associated to model-free and model-based methods of rein-
forcement learning, respectively (Daw et al., 2005). Model-
free models learn and use cached values of future states
or action-value associations, without explicitly representing
action-outcome and outcome-value relationships of the envi-
ronment, as model-based models do. Because PAV interacts
more with HAB than GDC (Holland, 2004), it might have a
model-free architecture similar to HAB (Dayan et al., 2006).
Alternatively, PAV could exploit the predictions done by both
GDC and HAB (Dayan and Seymour, 2008).
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Figure 1: The experimental paradigm. In blocks 1 and 2, the
shock is associated to one of two colors (CS), yellow or red.
In block 3, the shock is never delivered.
GDC vs. PAV: an experimental study
The aim of this study is investigating the interactions between
GDC and PAV in humans. In keeping with the aforemen-
tioned literature, we hypothesized that GDC and PAV could
be (partially) distinct processes, which can compete by trig-
gering two distinct motor commands: the former instrumental
to goal achievement, and the latter triggered by the detection
of a CS. When the two motor commands are in conflict, GDC
and PAV may compete to control behavior, and hence instru-
mental performance may be impaired.
We tested this hypothesis by comparing the performance of
human subjects in a sensorimotor task consisting in pressing a
button at the right time: when a ball moving from one side of
a screen to the opposite one is in the target (see fig. 1). In the
experimental condition, a CS (a color, either yellow or red)
anticipating the delivery of an US (an electric shock to the
pressing finger) was presented, while in the other condition
a neutral stimulus (NS, the other color) was presented. Sub-
jects were informed that they would have received the electric
shock if they were unable to press the button at the right time,
but only in the presence of CS, not NS. We hypothesized that,
since in the first (but not the second) condition GDC and PAV
compete for generating conflicting motor responses (”push”
for winning the game vs. ”raise the finger” as an innate avoid-
ance response, respectively), performance should be worse in
the first condition. Note that this would have the paradoxical
consequence that a Pavlovian response actually determines
more electric shock, making our study similar in spirit to the
aforementioned “negative automanteinance”.
To study the interaction of HAB vs. PAV (rather than GDC
vs. PAV) in the same framework, we designed a second ex-
perimental block of trials (block 2) identical to the first one,
with the hypothesis that after a sufficient number of trials the
response becomes habitual.
Finally, we were interested in studying if, after a CS-US
association has been repeated for many trials, CS activates
the conditioned response (CR) even in the absence of an ex-
plicit expectancy of US (manipulated trough verbal instruc-
tion). Although some findings suggest that CS can trigger di-
rectly CR (without the US expectancy), however this hypoth-
esis is controversial (Lovibond and Shanks, 2002). To this
aim, we designed a final experimental block of trials (block 3)
in which US (the electric shock) was never delivered and par-
ticipants were informed that they would have never received
it in that block.
Methods Eight participants (5 females, 3 males; average
age: 27) were tested in one session. During the session, each
participant was sitting in front of a computer screen. The task
consisted of 3 blocks, 80 trials for each block (fig. 1). At ev-
ery trial, a colored circle appeared in the center of the screen.
The circle was red for half of the trials and yellow for the
other half. After two seconds, a ball of the same color of the
circle appeared on one side of the screen and moved towards
the opposite side, passing through the circle. The speed of the
ball varied randomly trial by trial in all three blocks. The par-
ticipants had to press a button when the ball was in the circle.
Participants were divided into two groups. Participants from
group A received an electric shock when they made a mistake
(they either pressed too slowly or too fast) in the presence of
the red circle (CS), and never in the presence of the yellow cir-
cle (NS). Conversely, participants from group B received the
electric shock when making a mistake in the presence of the
yellow circle (CS), and never in the presence of the red circle
(NS). The intensity of the shock was established by each par-
ticipant before the experiment following the same procedure
as in (Ohman and Soares, 1998). In block 3, participants of
both groups never received an electric shock. At the begin-
ning of block 3, participants were informed of the absence of
shock delivery.
Results A repeated-measure ANOVA was conducted (fac-
tors: Block, 3 levels: 1, 2, 3. Stimulus, 2 levels: CS and NS).
The dependent variable was task performance (percentage of
winnings). The main effect of block was not significant, F
(2,14) = 3,011, p = 0,089 (p > 0,05), η2p = 0,3011. On the
contrary, the presence of CS significantly impaired perfor-
mance, F (1,7) = 25,94, p = 0,001 (p < 0,05), η2p = 0,787.
Interaction between Block and Stimulus is not significant, F
(2,14) = 0,139, p = 0.890 (p > 0,05), η2p = 0,019. This re-
sult indicates that the main effect of CS is stable in the three
blocks. Fig. 2 plots performance in Block x Stimulus condi-
tions.
Discussion We reasoned that, during the task, the subjects’
goal was to win the game and/or to avoid the shock (both give
rise to the same pressing action). Therefore, if behavior was
controlled only by GDC, performance should have been the
same in both CS and NS conditions in the case goal was win-
ning the game (and perhaps even better in CS condition in the
case the subject’s goal was that of avoiding the shock). Both
hypotheses are contrary to our findings. Indeed, we found that
the presence of a CS significantly impaired performance. In
keeping with the multicontroller perspective, we interpreted
this result as follows: in the presence of CS, a Pavlovian con-
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Figure 2: Results: interaction Block x Stimulus.
troller triggered a specific CR of finger withdrawal (as the
US associated to the CS corresponded to a shock delivered to
the finger), which interfered with the more adaptive pressing
response selected by the GDC1.
A second result is that we did not find habituation in the
three blocks (probably for weak statistical power). This does
not allow us to study interactions between HAB and PAV. To
this aim, it is necessary to test more subjects.
Finally, we found that the effect of CR activation on perfor-
mance was present in all of the three blocks. This result raises
interesting issues on the computational nature of PAV, that we
discuss in the following section through a computational the-
oretical proposal. Our model is based on the reported data
and on two further assumptions that, although being contro-
versial, have received some empirical support. First, we as-
sume that verbal instructions about CS-US contingency mod-
ify model-based causal representations in the brain, and that
those representations can be flexibly updated by subsequent
verbal instructions (Lovibond and Shanks, 2002). Therefore,
when the CS-US association is verbally induced (first and
second blocks, but not the third one), PAV might involve a
model-based component. Second, we assume that learning
the CS-CR association requires a slow trial-and-error proce-
dure (as for HAB) (Konorski, 1967), hence in the first block
that association should be absent or weaker. Since our data
suggest that the effect of PAV on performance is stable along
the three blocks, it might have a double nature, both model-
free and model-based.
Computational model of GDC vs. PAV
To further investigate the issue of a model-based, model-free
of hybrid nature of PAV, we designed four alternative com-
putational models of the interaction between GDC and PAV,
and compared them in a simulated scenario equivalent to the
human study described so far.
We implemented the four models (shown in figs. 4, 5, 6,
and 7) using the Dynamical Bayesian Network (DBN) for-
malism. Bayesian networks represent relevant variables as
nodes, and probabilistic relations between variables as edges.
1As discussed in the conclusions, we are conducting a control
experiment to rule out the possibility that impaired performance was
due to unspecific effects such as shivering or anxiety.
Figure 3: Illustration of state and action transitions
Figure 4: Model 1. Three time steps are reported. Bold lines
represent the GDC; dotted lines represent the environment.
DBNs add to this an explicit representation of temporal dy-
namics; indeed, in the figures, three temporal time steps are
shown (e.g., the three S in the figures are relative to time t,
t + 1 and t + 2). While most Bayesian models in cognitive
science incorporate only cognitive components, our models
integrate environmental dynamics (dotted lines) and dynam-
ics of multiple cognitive controllers, in our case GDC and
PAV (bold lines and thin lines, respectively), with their asso-
ciated cognitive variables. Variables used in the models are
shown in tab. 1 and explained in the main text.
Table 1: Variables used in the models, see figs. 4, 5, 6, and 7
var where explanation values
E world environmental state 1-18
B world agent behavior press, no press
S GDC state as cognitively represented 1-18
O GDC observations 1-18
A GDC selected action press, no press
US PAV unconditioned stimulus yes, no
CS PAV conditioned stimulus yes, no
CR PAV conditioned response press, no press
Model 1, shown in fig. 4, includes only GDC and its in-
teraction with the environment (ENV). States S represent the
position and speed of the ball in the screen. This variable can
assume 18 values, resulting from the combination of 9 spa-
tial positions and 2 speeds (”still” and ”moving”); see fig. 3.
Actions A represent the goal-oriented action and can assume
two values: ”press” and ”no press”. For instance, pressing in
S1 leads to S10; nor pressing leads in S2, and so on. (Note
that, once the button has been pressed, the ball remains in the
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Figure 5: Model 2. Bold lines represent the GDC; dotted lines
represent the environment; thin lines represent the PAV.
Figure 6: Model 3. Bold lines represent the GDC; dotted lines
represent the environment; thin lines represent the PAV.
same position for all of the following time steps and the trial
ends.) In Model 1 (and all the other models) the probability
of pressing is maximal when S = S5 and it is inversely propor-
tional to the distance from this value. Behaviors B represent
the effective behavior executed by the efferent motor system
and they can assume the same values as A: ”press” or ”no
press”. Noteworthy, in this model B depends only on A. En-
vironments E represent the real state of the world and depend
both on the previous E and on B. Observations O represent
the perceptive processes and depend both on E and S. Both E
and O can assume the same 18 values as S.
Model 2, shown in fig. 5, represents the interaction be-
tween GDC and a model-based PAV (plus the environment).
PAV is model-based in that CR is triggered only if the pres-
ence of CS recalls the explicit expectancy of the US. This
version adds three variables to the previous model. The first
variable is the Conditioned Stimulus CS and detects the pres-
ence or absence of CS. The second variable is the Uncondi-
tioned Stimulus US and detects the presence or the absence
of US. It depends on CS. Specifically, the conditional prob-
ability of US depends on the explicit belief that CS and US
are associated. Finally, the Conditioned Response CR repre-
sent the activation of CR and can assume the same values as
A (”press” or ”no press”). CR is activated every time US is
expected. Crucially, in this model, as well as in the following
ones, B depends jointly on A and CR.
Model 3, shown in fig. 6, implements a model-free PAV.
This model is similar to the second one, except that CS and
Figure 7: Model 4. Bold lines represent the GDC; dotted lines
represent the environment; thin lines represent the PAV.
US are not connected. They are both directly connected to
CR. Noteworthy, in this case, US cannot be anticipated by CS,
in that they are not linked. At the beginning of the task, CR
dependence on CS is null and it is strengthened every time the
US and the CS are presented together. In other words, after a
sort of trial-and-error learning of the US-CS association, the
CS can trigger the the CR even if presented alone.
Model 4, shown in fig. 7, implements both model-based
and model-free PAV. This was obtained by linking both CS
and US, and CS and CR. The first link is active when there is
an explicit belief of the association between the US and the
CS; the second link is active after that the US and the CS have
been repeatedly paired.
Note that all models, transitions S→ A, A→ B, and CR→
B are probabilistic. Rather, for the sake of simplicity, we de-
signed the less relevant transitions S→ A, B→ E, A→ S,
and S→ S as deterministic (however, equivalent results are
obtained by making them probabilistic).
Simulations and results
We tested the four models in a simulated scenario equivalent
to the human experiment described so far. Testing consists
in computing the marginal probability of the node E at time
step t = 10. A trial is “won” if E = S14 (this corresponds to
executing the action ”press” in state S5); otherwise it is “lost”.
In other words, we recorded the probability distribution of the
final position of the ball.
We set the value of variables as follows (see also tab. 2). In
conditions in which CS was present, in models implementing
PAV (models 2, 3, and 4), the value of the node CS was set
to ”yes”. In blocks 1 and 2, in models where US depends
on CS if they are linked (models 2 and 4), the conditional
probability of the node US was set so as when CS = ”yes”,
then US = ”yes”. At the same time, in models where CS is
directly associated to CR (models 3 and 4), the conditional
probability of the node CR was set so as when CS = ”yes”,
however CR = ”no press”. Conversely, in blocks 2 and 3, in
models where US depends on CS if they are linked (models 2
and 4), the conditional probability of the node US was set so
as when CS = ”yes”, however US = ”no”. In models where CS
is directly associated to CR (models 3 and 4), the conditional
probability of the node CR was set so as when CS = ”yes”,
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Table 2: Value of variables and conditioned distributions in the four models (for each block and trial)
block trial M1 M2 M3 M4
1 CS - CS=yes→ US=yes CS=yes→ CR=no press CS=yes→ US=yes
1 NS - CS=no→ US=no CS=no→ CR=no press CS=no→ US=no
2 CS - CS=yes→ US=yes CS=yes→ CR= press CS=yes→ US=no, CR=press
2 NS - CS=no→ US=no CS=no→ CR=no press CS=yes→ US=no, CR=no press
3 CS - CS=yes→ US=no CS=yes→ CR= press CS=yes→ CR= press
3 NS - CS=no→ US=no CS=no→ CR=no press CS=no→ CR=no press
Figure 8: Performance of the four Bayesian models.
CR = ”press”.
Results of the simulation are shown in fig. 8. Plots of the
Block x Stimulus interaction show that only model 4 compares
well with human data (fig. 2) in all three conditions. Model 1
cannot account the finding that the performance is affected by
the presence of CS. Model 2 cannot account for data relative
to block 3, since the belief that US follows the CS was not
present, and model 3 cannot account for data relative to block
1, since CS still was not able to directly trigger CR.
General Discussion
Goal-directed (GDC) and Pavlovian (PAV) controllers may
interact at many levels. For instance, animal studies have
investigated the likely influence of PAV over the values as-
signed to outcomes. This phenomenon emerges in paradigms
such as Pavlovian instrumental tranfer, conditioned rein-
forcement and conditioned suppression, in which the presen-
tation of a CS during an instrumental task may influence the
values assigned to outcomes, which, in turn, may influence
frequency and vigor of instrumental actions (Holland, 2004).
(Note that, in these paradigms, the influence of PAV over the
goal-oriented action is indirect.)
Although it has been suggested that interaction between
GDC and PAV could be at the origin of important phenomena
like emotional reactions and paradoxical misbehavior (Dayan
and Seymour, 2008), so far it has not been studied in humans,
nor it has been studied in animals in the aversive sensori-
motor case (but see a report that squirrel monkeys, punished
for biting on a restraining leash, tend to increase their biting
Morse et al., 1967). This study investigates the direct influ-
ence of PAV over goal-oriented actions in humans. Specifi-
cally, we were interested in the sensorimotor conflict between
GDC and PAV in the aversive domain, namely when US cor-
responds to a punishment. We found that, in a task where a
conditioned response and an instrumental command impose
opposite constraints to action selection, PAV can exert an in-
fluence over GDC, even if this paradoxically determines de-
livery of more punishment rather than its avoidance. In our
discussion and computational model, we described interac-
tion between GDC and PAV at the motor level, or in other
words as the competition of CR and A for determining the
behavioral response.
This claim is in agreement with a previous model of in-
teraction between PAV and instrumental processes, proposed
by Dayan et al. (2006). In line with many proposals framed
in the reinforcement learning paradigm, this model considers
PAV as a model-free process similar to HAB. In this perspec-
tive, PAV would learn to anticipate the cached values of future
states through a trial-and-error procedure, and not the future
states themselves, as typical of model-based systems. How-
ever, contrary to HAB, PAV would not associate a learned
instrumental action to those anticipations, but rather an un-
learned CR. Although this point of view is common in ani-
mal research, nonetheless it has been questioned by human
studies, which suggest that CS may trigger CR only if US is
explicitly expected (suggesting a model-based component of
PAV) (Lovibond and Shanks, 2002). Relative to this debate,
our experimental and computational study suggests that PAV
may involve both model-free and model-based processes; in-
deed, PAV seemed to impair performance both in block 1,
when subjects expected US, and in block 3, when subjects
had learned a CS-CR association. However, our results are
also in line with an alternative interpretation, according to
which PAV is exclusively a model-free process that, con-
versely to HAB, establishes CS-CR associations very quickly.
Thus, just few trials cold be sufficient for CS to trigger CR
directly (without model-based CS-US associations). Further
investigations are necessary to disentangle these two alterna-
tive hypotheses, for example by varying the amount of trials
in which the shock is delivered before the extinction phase.
A final issue concerns the interaction between GDC and
PAV on the one hand, and between HAB and PAV on the
other hand. In relation to this, Dayan et al. (2006) hypothe-
sized that, as GDC is based on a tree-search (for the predic-
tion of future prospects), it can anticipate the consequences of
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Pavlovian responses, which can therefore be easier to elimi-
nate. Conversely, PAV and HAB should more plausibly com-
pete, because they are at the same level of processing. Con-
sequently, PAV might interact mostly with HAB, rather than
with GDC.
In our experiment, to distinguish GDC vs. PAV from HAB
vs. PAV interactions, we designed two blocks. We hypothe-
sized that, in block 1 the absence of previous experience leads
to recruitment of GDC, while in block 2 the task can be rou-
tinizing, possibly leading to recruitment of HAB. Since we
did not find the main effect of block (plausibly due to weak
statistical power), we were not allowed to study the HAB vs.
PAV interaction and thus we delimit our discussion to the
GDC vs. PAV one. Our results indicate that GDC, at least
in this circumstance, cannot “compensate” for the effects of
PAV, although it is possible that with more trials a more accu-
rate predictive model of the PAV influence could allow so.
In sum, the present study suggests that, at least in aversive
domains, model-free and possibly also model-based Pavlo-
vian processes interfere with GDC directly at the motor level.
Further investigations are necessary to clarify crucial aspects
of this phenomenon, such as in what conditions GDC prevail
on PAV, and whether the interaction is due to specific motor
responses (e.g., raising the finger), as we hypothesized, or to
more broad motor processes, such as shivering, or even to
processes that lie outside motor performance, such as anxiety
and attention (Mobbs et al., 2007). Furthermore, although
our results point to a double nature of PAV (both model-free
and model-based mechanisms seem to be involved, at least
during the interaction with GDC), however they cannot rule
out the possibility that PAV is a “fast-learning” model-free
system. Moreover, the neural bases of such interactions are
largely unknown. Our ongoing work regards the investigation
of hypothesis that the competition between the goal-oriented
action and CR, and the surprise of GDC (generated by the
unexpected motor activation due to the Pavlovian influence),
may be related, respectively, to the cingulate cortex, involved
in conflict monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2001), and the pari-
etal cortex, involved in the sense of agency (Blakemore and
Frith, 2003). Additional important issues for future research
are studying the mechanisms through which cognitive agents
predict increasingly distal consequences of actions (Pezzulo,
2011; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2007), learn to inhibit pre-
potent responses and exert cognitive control over extended
periods of time (Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009) .
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